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JUDICIAL BIAS AND
FINANCIAL INTEREST AS
GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF
FEDERAL JUDGES
Seth E. Bloom*
Federal judges may be disqualified if they are biased against or in favor of the
parties before them or if they have a financial interest in the case being heard. The
author examines the statutory framework for disqualification and analyzes the courts'
approach to enforcing these statutes. He concludes that the courts have taken an
overly rigid approach--confining judicial bias disqualification to cases of personal
bias but requiring disqualification for remote and insubstantial financial interests in a
party to the case He proposes more flexible standards that would allow disqualifica-
tion based on the appearance of bias even though a judge is not prejudiced against or
in favor of a party and that would allow waiver of disqualification forfinancial inter-
ests if the parties believe that those interests do not affect the judge's impartiality.
INTRODUCTION
ONE OF THE most fundamental and self-evident principles of
any fair system of justice is that judges must be neutral and im-
partial. In the United States, the Constitution requires that a "neu-
tral and detached judge" preside over judicial proceedings.' Not
surprisingly, determining when a judge is truly impartial and the
circumstances under which disqualification2 is required often have
* B.A., University of Rochester (1981); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1984). The
author is an associate with the law firm of Casson, Calligaro & Mutryn in Washington, D.C.
and member of District of Columbia and New York Bars. He wishes to acknowledge grate-
fully the advice and encouragement of Professor A. Leo Levin during the preparation of this
Article. This Article was awarded the 1984 Henry C. Loughlin Prize by the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955).
2. At the outset, it should be noted that the term "recusal" has a technical definition
different than that of "disqualification." "Disqualification" refers to statutorily mandated
removal of a judge, while "recusal" refers to a judge's voluntarily standing down on his own
initiative. Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHt. L.
REV. 236, 237 n.5 (1978). This distinction is of little importance today because "[u]nder
current statutes, disqualification is mandated in virtually all cases where recusal is appropri-
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been difficult.
This Article focuses on two important topics in modem federal
judicial disqualification law: judicial bias, especially situations
where a judge has formed an opinion about a legal issue in dispute
or the subject matter of a case before hearing it, and disqualification
for financial interest in the litigation. These subjects reflect a funda-
mental tension inherent in judicial disqualification law: the conflict
between the basic due process mandate of an impartial judiciary and
the need for efficient administration of justice and conservation of
judicial resources. Current law is deficient because its rigid ap-
proach frequently fails to accommodate these sometimes incompati-
ble interests.
This Article first summarizes modem federal judicial disqualifi-
cation standards.3 It then analyzes the current approaches to judi-
cial bias and financial interest, sets forth deficiencies of these
approaches, and suggests reforms.4
I. MODERN FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION LAW
A. The Purposes of Judicial Disqualification
The Supreme Court has found that the Constitution's due pro-
cess guarantee5 requires that an impartial and detached judge pre-
side over judicial proceedings.6 While an obvious goal of judicial
disqualification law is to ensure that fair and impartial judges hear
every case, this body of law serves an even more fundamental pur-
pose: that of maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system. Public confidence is essential to effective function-
ing of the judiciary because, "possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword," the judiciary depends primarily on the willingness of mem-
bers of society to follow its mandates.7 The judiciary could not
ate." Id. In addition, "judge" is used to refer to both federal judges and Justices of the
Supreme Court, unless otherwise indicated.
3. See infra notes 5-112 and accompanying text.
4. For the judicial bias discussion, see infra notes 113-208 and accompanying text; for
the financial interest discussion, see infra notes 209-52 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. ... ).
6. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); see also In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.").
7. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1970) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
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function as a viable institution in a democracy if the public lost faith
in the impartiality and integrity of its judges.
Despite the importance of an impartial judiciary, there are
strong countervailing reasons for limiting disqualification of judges.
First, if the standards for disqualification are too easily met, "the
increasing frequency of disqualification. . . might arguably tend to
undermine public confidence in the judiciary by disparaging the
general impartiality of judges."' A second and more important rea-
son is that excessive disqualification would seriously damage the ef-
ficient administration of justice. If a judge is disqualified after the
litigation is well along, the costs of delay and waste of judicial re-
sources may be very high. These costs are especially apparent in
lengthy and complex civil litigation, where disqualification may re-
sult in the loss of a judge who is thoroughly familiar with the com-
plicated factual details of a case or who has become expert in a
highly technical field. Motions to disqualify are often made a con-
siderable time after the case is assigned to a judge because it is not
until then that the parties learn of possible bias or a conflict of inter-
est.9 Moreover, if an appellate court rules that the trial judge
should have recused himself, the time and expense of the entire
original proceeding have been wasted.
A third concern is avoidance of "judge shopping." If disqualifi-
cation is easily achieved, litigants may attempt to manipulate the
procedure to their advantage. That is, they may seek to disqualify
one judge so the case will be heard by a judge they believe is more
favorable to their side. This practice also would erode public confi-
dence in the judiciary.
Finally, if an overly strict disqualification standard were applied
at the Supreme Court level, it could result in vitally important legal
issues not being decided. Six Justices are needed for a quorum in
the Supreme Court1° and substitute Justices are not available. In
most circumstances where a quorum does not exist, the Court must
affirm the judgment below "with the same effect as upon affirmance
by an equally divided court,"' that is, the affirmance has no prece-
8. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 736, 747 (1973).
9. E.g., In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.) (request for disqualifi-
cation based on judge's wife's small ownership interest in a party not made until five years
after trial judge assigned to case), affid mem. sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court,
459 U.S. 1191 (1982).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
11. Id. This is true except for the unusual case of a direct appe4 from a district court.
In a direct appeal, the statute provides that the case may be remitted to the court of appeals
[Vol. 35:662
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dential value. The only other option is for a majority of qualified
Justices to vote to hear the case at the next term.12
In summary, disqualification law must avoid excessive removal
of judges, which may do serious harm to public confidence and judi-
cial efficiency and promote judge shopping. These considerations
conflict with the goal of achieving complete judicial impartiality.
Therefore, a compromise between concerns is necessary. The dis-
qualification statutes need to be examined to determine if they strike
a proper balance.
B. The Federal Statutory Scheme
Even though impartial judges are constitutionally required, 13
disqualification determinations very rarely are made on constitu-
tional grounds. The Supreme Court has held that "most matters
relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional
level." 4 Instead, several statutory provisions and the case law in-
terpreting them provide the basis for federal disqualification law.
There are three main provisions. The first, section 47, states a
narrow and simple prohibition: "No judge shall hear or determine
an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him."' 5 The
second, section 144, provides a procedure for litigants to seek dis-
in the circuit in which the district court sat. The decision of that court of appeals is final. Id.
A leading commentator discussed the conflicting policies implicated, particularly at the
Supreme Court level:
All courts want justice done, but the conflict of values comes over method; if dis-
qualification of judges is too easy, both the cost and the delay of justice go out of
bounds. If disqualification is too hard, cases may be decided quickly but unfairly.
Nowhere is that conflict of values more glaring than in the United States Supreme
Court, where the cases are usually important. If a justice sits who should not, great
interests may be jeopardized; but if a justice disqualifies who should not, vital ques-
tions may be needlessly left without authoritative decision. For under existing law,
there is no procedure for replacing a disqualified justice of the Supreme Court even
when his non-participation deprives the litigants of the statutory quorum necessary
for decision.
Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 608-09 (1947).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1982).
13. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("[lIt certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his
liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.").
14. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948); accord Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1982). The phrase "case or issue" has been construed to mean "a
final Order of the lower court which may be appealed to a higher court." United States v.
Garramone, 374 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Educ., 431 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1970) (disqualification arises when judge has
tried or heard any question which the appeals court will consider). See generally 13A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3545, at 595-97
(1984) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER] (judge disqualified to sit on the court of
1985]
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qualification by filing an affidavit stating the trial judge is "person-
ally biased" against or in favor of a party.16 Finally, section 455
delineates the situations requiring self-imposed disqualification by a
federal judge. 7 The latter two statutes warrant separate discussion.
1. Section 144
Section 144 provides a procedure for disqualifying federal dis-
trict court judges 8 because of personal bias or prejudice. This stat-
ute was first enacted in 1911 and remains relatively unchanged.
The section's language could be interpreted to provide for peremp-
tory and automatic removal of judges on a party's motion. It states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before
whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be as-
signed to hear such proceeding. 19
The legislative history of section 144 lends support to an auto-
matic removal interpretation.20 However, the courts consistently
construe the statute narrowly, which makes disqualification diffi-
cult. This narrow interpretation draws from the arguments that it
protects the judiciary from "frivolous attacks upon its dignity and
integrity," it prevents abuse of the disqualification laws, and it en-
appeals if he has heard the whole case or a particular issue, but he may sit on appeal for issues
other than those on which he has ruled).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
17. Id. § 455.
18. By its terms, § 144 applies only to district court judges. See id. § 144 (providing
procedure for seeking removal of judges in "any proceeding in a district court"); see also
Millslagle v. Olson, 128 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1942) (holding § 144 inapplicable to circuit
courts of appeal). In contrast, § 455 applies to all federal judges. See infra note 49.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
20. When the House of Representatives was considering the legislation, Representative
Cullop of Indiana was asked whether the statute would allow district court judges discretion
to determine the sufficiency of affidavits of bias. He answered:
Mr. Cullop: No; it provides that the judge shall proceed no further with the
case. The filing of the affidavit deprives him of further jurisdiction in the case.
Mr. Cox of Indiana: [S]uppose the affidavit sets out certain reasons which may
exist in the mind of the party making the affidavit; suppose the judge to whom the
affidavit is submitted says that it is not a statutory reason? In other words, does it
not leave it to the discretion of the judge?
Mr. Cullop: No; it expressly provides that the judge shall proceed no further.
46 CONG. REC. 2627 (1911). "An automatic disqualification process apparently was the goal
of Congress in enacting the original recusal legislation." Note, Caesar's Wife Revisited: Judi-
cial Disqualification After the 1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1201, 1216
(1977).
[Vol. 35:662
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sures "orderly functioning of the judicial system. 21
Disqualification under section 144 is not initiated by the judge.
Instead, the party alleging bias must file an affidavit with the chal-
lenged judge stating "the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists."' 22 Judges examining a section 144 affidavit
are precluded from evaluating the truth or falsity of the facts al-
leged but instead must accept all of them as true.23 However, since
the 1921 Supreme Court ruling in Berger v. United States,24 it has
been well settled that a judge is not automatically disqualified by the
allegations of bias in the affidavit even though they are presumed to
be true.25 The judge first must determine if the allegations are "le-
gally sufficient" to prove bias. If so, then he is disqualified. The
Court in Berger held that to be legally sufficient, the affidavit "must
give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind [on the part of the
judge] that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment. '26
The Court believed that automatic disqualification had too much
potential for abuse and could lead to judge shopping.27 The obliga-
tion to consider the legal sufficiency of the allegations of bias thus
makes disqualification under section 144 far from automatic. More-
over, requiring the allegations to be legally sufficient renders the
prohibition against the judge's examining their truth much less
important.
The judiciary's strict construction of the affidavit requirement
limits the scope of disqualification under section 144. A party seek-
ing to remove a judge bears a heavy burden, because the affidavit "is
strictly construed against the party seeking disqualification."28 To
21. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30 U. KAN. L. REv. 255,
256 (1982).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921); Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry
L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983); Hodgson
v. Liquor Salesmen's Union Local No. 2, 444 F.2d 1344, 1348 (2d Cir. 1971). The statute
requires that a § 144 affidavit "be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating
that it is made in good faith." 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982). The purpose of this certificate is to
prevent abuse of the affidavit and to discourage false accusations in it. United States v. Han-
rahan, 248 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D.D.C. 1965). It is assumed that in filing the affidavit, an
attorney will not recklessly disregard the truth. Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227,
1229 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971).
24. 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (interpreting § 21 of the Judicial Code, predecessor to § 144).
25. See, eg., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 510 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
26. 255 U.S. at 33-34 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 33.
28. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3551, at 631-33; see Beland v. United
States, 117 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585 (1941). For a discussion of the
standard of proof required under § 144, see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
be legally sufficient, the affidavit must contain specific facts and cir-
cumstances demonstrating bias.29 Mere allegations, rumors, gossip,
or suppositions are not sufficient.30 The policy of not allowing the
affiant's conclusions, inferences, or speculations conclusively to
demonstrate bias further undermines the admonition that the court
accept the affidavit as true.31
Section 144 requires disqualification only if the affidavit shows
that the judge has "personal bias or prejudice" toward a party.3 2
Courts have developed a considerable jurisprudence as to what con-
stitutes personal bias. They have placed great emphasis on the fact
that the statute does not provide for disqualification on the basis of
general or judicial bias.33 Personal bias usually refers to bias in
favor of or against a specific party, in contrast to judicial bias,
which refers to prejudgment of the legal issues or the merits. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to
be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case. ' '34  In application, the
extrajudicial source rule has led to decisions that prior rulings in the
case that are adverse to the moving party do not constitute personal
29. United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 907 (1979).
30. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Halde-
man, 559 F.2d 31, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
31. United States v. Platshorn, 488 F. Supp. 1367, 1368-69 (S.D. Fla. 1980); see Com-
ment, Disqualification of Federal Judges: Statutory Right to Recusal and the 1974 Amend-
ments to Title 28, 31 Sw. L.J. 887, 889 (1977). The statute also provides that a party may file
only one § 144 affidavit in any one case. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
33. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the judicial definitions of "personal
bias or prejudice" in great detail. For thorough analyses of the interpretations, see Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1966);
Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge-The Standard Under Section 144, 57
MINN. L. REV. 749 (1973); Comment, supra note 31; Comment, supra note 2.
34. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). An early leading case
discussed the notion of personal bias. " 'Personal' is in contrast with judicial; it characterizes
an attitude of extrajudicial origin, derived nom coram judice. 'Personal' characterizes clearly
the prejudgment guarded against. It is the significant word of the statute." Craven v. United
States, 22 F.2d 605, 607-08 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627 (1928). There is an
exception to the rule that, to mandate disqualification, bias must stem from an extrajudicial
source. That is when the judicial conduct shows "pervasive bias." Whitehurst v. Wright, 592
-F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979). However, this exception is rarely applied. In Whitehurst, a relative
of a person shot by a policeman sued the officer. The trial judge said in a pretrial hearing that
"it bothers me a great deal that people get sued for doing their duty." The court of appeals
held that this statement did not show pervasive bias and thus the trial judge was not disquali-
fied. Id. at 838 n.5.
[Vol. 35:662
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bias. 5 Nor is an opinion on the merits of a case that a judge ac-
quires from the evidence considered to be personal bias.36 Further-
more, a judge's past exposure to a current party generally is not
considered grounds for disqualification.37
Most courts will not disqualify a judge because of statements
made during the proceedings that are adverse to a party or attorney,
or favorable to the other side.3" This is consistent with the require-
ment that only extrajudicial conduct can show personal bias. The
rule does not prohibit examination of any courtroom activity.3 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has said that "[c]omments
and rulings by a judge during the trial of a case may well be relevant
to the question of the existence of prejudice."'
Courts rarely find personal bias in allegations that a judge has
predetermined the merits of a case or previously formed an opinion
on issues currently before the court. 1 Courts also refuse to accept a
judge's background orlassociations as grounds for finding personal
bias.42 "The basic rule is that personal bias or prejudice must go
directly to the judge's personal appraisal of the party, and cannot
relate merely to his background and associations."43
The amount of evidence necessary to prove bias under section
144 is determined under a "bias-in-fact" standard. "The allegations
must be sufficient to support a conclusion that bias actually ex-
35. In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). 1
36. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 583; 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3542 at 559-60.
37. Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1967)
38. See, e-g., Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 825 (5th
Cir. 1969); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3542, at 573.
39. See 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3542, at 573-75 ("However the rule
that bias to be disqualifying must be extrajudicial in origin does not mean that nothing that
happens in the courtroom is relevant. The judge's behavior during the trial may demonstrate
the existence of a personal basis.").
40. Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. E.g., Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1913). See also 13A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 15, § 3542, at 568 ("Disqualification is not required because the judge
has definitive views as to the law of a particular case.").
42. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.); State of
Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981) (legal philosophy ofjudge insufficient to
disqualify if no other factors present); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (being female and having worked with blacks not disqualifying in civil rights
case); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F.
Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (background of judge insufficient to require recusal if no other
factors indicate prejudice to a party), afd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999
(1975). See infra notes 113-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issues of per-
sonal background and legal philosophy.
43. Comment, supra note 31, at 891.
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ists."'  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that this re-
quires the moving party to show that "the facts be such, their truth
being assumed, as would convince a reasonable man that bias ex-
ists."45 The Third Circuit has incorporated this bias-in-fact stan-
dard into its three-part test for disqualifying a judge under section
144.46
In summary, disqualification under section 144 places a great
burden on the party seeking to remove a judge. The affiant must
allege specific facts showing bias, must prove those facts amount to
personal bias, and must show the facts are sufficient to convince a
reasonable person that bias actually exists. This is difficult to ac-
complish, especially when the affidavit is construed against the
party seeking disqualification.47 A different and much broader ap-
proach to disqualification is taken under section 455.
2. Section 455
Section 455 states the circumstances under which all federal
judges must disqualify themselves.48 Unlike section 144, it is not
44. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 723 (emphasis added). One commentator has stated that
to satisfy his burden of proof under § 144, "the party must allege that the judge has the bias
and must present facts and reasons for a belief that bias exists." Comment, supra note 2, at
243.
45. Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
46. The affiant has the burden of showing three elements:
1. The facts must be material and state particularity;
2. The facts must be such that, if true they would convince a reasonable man that a
bias exists;
3. The facts must show the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature.
Thompson, 483 F.2d at 528 (footnote omitted).
47. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Section 455 provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a mate-
rial witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity par-
ticipated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
[Vol. 35:662
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restricted to cases of personal bias or prejudice. The present section
455, as rewritten in 1974, is mandatory; if any of the specified cir-
cumstances are present, the judge must recuse himself. 9 In con-
trast to section 144, the statute is self-enforcing. No motion or
affidavit need be filed by a party, but rather the judge must recuse
himself sua sponte whenever any of the circumstances listed in sec-
tion 455 are present.
Prior to 1974, section 455 was quite different. It required a fed-
eral judge to disqualify himself only in certain specified situations in
which he had a "substantial interest" in the outcome of a case or if,
"in his opinion," he was so related to a party or attorney that his
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially af-
fected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial inter-
ests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial
interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the
meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of
litigation;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee,
and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the
affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is
not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the
management of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organi-
zation is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company,
of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest,
is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceed-
ing could substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer
only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a
waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the
ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted
provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification.
49. Under certain circumstances, the parties may agree to waive the judge's disqualifica-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1982); see infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. Unlike § 144,
which applies only to district court judges, § 455 applies to all federal judges and justices. See
Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980); 13A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 15, § 3551, at 630.
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participation was rendered improper.50 The pre-1974 statute was
widely criticized,"' in part because the requirement of "substantial
interest" was ill-defined.52 In addition, several prominent cases of
questionable judicial ethics had been widely reported in the late
1960's and early 1970's.53 The Watergate scandal also brought de-
mands for improved ethical standards in government.
In an effort to "broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial dis-
qualification,"54 Congress in 1974 adopted the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C, which governed
judicial disqualification. 5  Congress made few changes in codifying
Canon 3C as section 455.56 One of the main purposes of the new
section 455 was to make the statute conform to the Code of Judicial
Conduct and thus eliminate the "dual standards, statutory and ethi-
cal [that] . . .had the effect of forcing a judge to decide either the
legal issue or the ethical issue at his peril."5 7
The current section 455 is divided into two parts. Section
50. Section 455 prior to the 1974 revision stated:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material
witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
51. See Note, supra note 8, at 736-37; Comment, supra note 2, at 238-39.
52. The committee report accompanying the bill amending § 455 stated that the stan-
dards under the previous statute were generally "indefinite and ambiguous." H.R. REP. No.
1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351, 6352.
53. See cases collected in Note, supra note 8. For example, Justice Fortas resigned from
the Supreme Court in 1969 because of a scandal involving allegations that he received im-
proper extrajudicial compensation. Id. at 736 n.1. Also, the Senate's rejection of the nomina-
tion of Clement Haynesworth as the replacement for Justice Fortas was based partially on the
belief that Judge Haynesworth should have recused himself in several cases involving poten-
tial conflicts of interest. Id. at 736 n.2. In one case, Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968), Judge Haynesworth was alleged to have joined in
an opinion even though he owned $16,000 worth of stock in the prevailing corporation. An-
other controversy surrounded Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). See infra notes 89-91 and accompany-
ing text; see also Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 106 (1973) (concluding that Justice Rehnquist did not violate § 455, but
that his participation was inconsistent with the goal of an impartial judiciary).
54. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6351.
55. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1980). The Judicial Conference of the
United States already had adopted Canon 3C. See 69 F.R.D. 273, 277 (1975).
56. One significant change from the Code was to make clear that disqualification under
section 455 was to be mandatory. The statute accomplished this by stating that a judge "shall
disqualify himself" under the circumstances listed. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982) (emphasis added).
Canon 3C, however, states that a judge "should disqualify himself" in the same situations.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1980) (emphasis added).
57. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6351-52.
[Vol. 35:662
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
455(a) states the general disqualification standard. It provides that
any judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."58 Subsection (b) then
enumerates specific circumstances in which a judge must recuse
himself. 9
According to the legislative history, the general language of sec-
tion 455(a) was intended to replace the subjective standard of the
pre-1974 statute with a purely objective test.' Previously, a judge
was required to recuse himself if he had a substantial interest in the
case or "in his opinion" it was improper for him to hear the case.61
The new standard was "designed to promote public confidence in
the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is
a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he
should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the
case."62 Heeding this legislative history, the courts generally have
adopted an objective standard in deciding whether recusal is re-
quired under section 455(a).63
The amended section 455 made another important change in the
law by removing the "duty-to-sit" rule. The prior rule was that a
judge had a duty to hear a case if the alleged statutory grounds for
disqualification, including bias, had not been proven.' By provid-
ing that a judge would be automatically disqualified whenever his
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the amendments ef-
fectively removed the duty-to-sit concept.65
58. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
59. Id. § 455(b).
60. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6354-55.
61. See supra note 50.
62. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6355.
63. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, "[t]he standard to be applied under
section 455(a) is an objective one: whether the reasonable person, knowing all of the sur-
rounding circumstances, would consider the judge to be impartial." United States v. Norton,
700 F.2d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983).
64. See, eg., In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961) (there is as much
obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no reason, as there is for him to
do so when there is a reason), cert denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1962); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 15, § 3549, at 609.
65. The report concluded that this provision removed the duty to sit concept. See H.R.
REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6355. Most courts have agreed that the duty to sit was
abolished by the 1974 statute. See, eg., United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1977) (new rule designed to give more flexibility); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,
139 n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (purpose of new rule was to eliminate duty to sit), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 944 (1977); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975)
(the new language was intended to overrule the duty to sit decisions). Some courts, however,
still attempt to articulate a limited version of the duty. See, eg., Simonson v. General Motors
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 574, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (recusal and reassignment is not to be taken
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
One of the most important questions faced by the courts after
the 1974 amendments was the amount of evidence necessary to
show that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
The traditional rule in reviewing allegations of bias under section
144 was the bias-in-fact standard-the allegations had to be suffi-
cient to show that bias actually existed.66 However, the broad lan-
guage of section 455(a) suggests a different test that is easier to
satisfy. Section 455(a) calls for an appearance-of-bias standard, re-
quiring only that the allegations support a reasonable suspicion of
bias.67
The drafters of Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct
clearly intended such an appearance-of-bias standard. The Re-
porter's Notes to the Code state that "[a]ny conduct that would
lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances to the conclu-
sion that the judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' is
a basis for the judge's disqualification. ' 68 Further, the Notes indi-
cate that disqualification would be required if "participation by the
judge in the proceeding . . . creates the appearance of a lack of
impartiality. ' 69 The legislative history of the 1974 amendments
also supports the use of an appearance-of-bias standard.70
Given this background, the courts generally have applied an ap-
pearance-of-bias test under section 455(a). The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has stated that "the question is not whether the
judge is impartial in fact" but whether a reasonable person might
doubt the judge's impartiality on the basis of all the circum-
stances. 7' This standard makes disqualification more likely than
lightly; there is an obligation not to recuse oneself absent a valid reason for recusal); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 526-27 (D.S.C. 1975) (the duty to sit
obligation is still present when the duty is "especially strong" as where disqualification was
requested only after the judge had acquired thorough knowledge in the case); Lazofsky v.
Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1044-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (new test should not be
used by judges to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial cases).
66. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 2, at 242-43
and cases cited at 242-43 n.37.
67. Under § 455(a), of course, a judge is not limited to considering the facts alleged on
any affidavit-no affidavit is necessary-but may consider all the facts and circumstances.
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982); infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
68. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973) (quot-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).
69. Id. at 61.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6354-55.
71. Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978); accord United States v.
Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 461-62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976); United States v.
Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 (1976).
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the bias-in-fact test,72 and therefore is consistent with one of the
main purposes of the 1974 amendments-to broaden the grounds
for judicial disqualification.73
Nevertheless, not all courts agree that the appearance-of-bias
standard is proper. Both the Fifth74 and the Ninth Circuits7 5 em-
ploy the more difficult to satisfy bias-in-fact test in all cases in which
the judge's impartiality is questioned, whether under section 455 or
section 144. This view is based on subsection (b)(1) of section 455,
which provides that a judge must recuse himself when he has "per-
sonal bias or prejudice."76 The Ninth Circuit interprets section
455(b)(1) as "simply provid[ing] a specific example of a situation in
which a judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' pur-
suant to section 455(a)."77 Therefore, the court reasons, "it would
be incorrect as a matter of statutory construction to interpret sec-
tion 455(a) as setting up a different test for disqualification for bias
or prejudice from that in section 455(b)(1)."78 Since section
455(b)(1) uses the same language as section 144, the court has con-
cluded that the section 144 bias-in-fact standard must apply to sec-
tion 455(b)(1) and therefore to section 455(a).79
This approach has been sharply criticized8" and seems incorrect.
First, it directly contradicts the language of section 455(a) and its
legislative history. The committee report explicitly states that sec-
tion 455(a) was intended not only to broaden the grounds for dis-
qualification, but to establish grounds for disqualification distinct
from those in subsection (b).8 1 Second, in order to find that section
455(a) and section 144 demand the same standard, the statutes must
72. For example, consider a situation where the judge's former law firm is representing
the plaintiff before the judge but the firm was not involved with the case or the client while
the judge was affiliated with the firm. It would be difficult to show that the judge actually had
bias in favor of the plaintiff. However, a reasonable person might doubt the judge's ability to
remain impartial. In this situation, disqualification would be required only if the appearance-
of-bias standard was applied.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6351.
74. E.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc).
75. E.g., United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Conforte,
624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1982).
77. Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867.
78. Olander, 584 F.2d at 882.
79. Id.
80. See, eg., Comment, supra note 2, at 248-49.
81. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6355.
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be construed in pari materia.82 Such a statutory analysis is inappro-
priate since the statutes-one enacted in 1911 and the other
amended in 1974-can hardly be considered companion legislation
that should be read together.8
3
Employment of the more stringent appearance-of-bias standard,
as the statute and legislative history apparently demand, renders the
bias-in-fact test of section 144 nearly irrelevant. Section 455(a) ap-
plies to all cases of bias and its stricter standard of disqualification
necessarily prevails. Of course, a party can disqualify a judge by
proving bias actually exists under section 144. However, if a party
cannot meet the section 144 test, but can demonstrate a reasonable
appearance of lack of impartiality, the judge will be disqualified
under section 455(a).84
Section 455(b) lists specific circumstances under which the judge
must disqualify himself. Subsection (b)(1) states that a judge shall
disqualify himself if "he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con-
cerning the proceeding."85 Since it uses the "personal bias or preju-
dice" language, the subsection uniformly has been held to be
governed by the judicial definition of personal bias developed under
section 144.86 Prior personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts also is a ground for disqualification under subsection (b)(1)
because such knowledge reduces "the judge's ability to be
impartial."87
Subsection (b)(2) requires recusal if the judge had served in pri-
vate practice as a lawyer "in the matter," was associated with an-
other lawyer who had worked on the matter, or was a material
witness concerning it.88 Subsection (b)(3) disqualifies a judge if,
while in prior governmental employment, the judge participated as
counsel, advisor, or material witness in the matter, or "expressed an
82. The Fifth Circuit does so explicitly. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1052. The Ninth Circuit has
done so implicitly, as indicated by its decisions. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. As one commentator concluded, "reading the two sections in pari materia violates
the usual rules of statutory construction. Section 144 was enacted in 1911 and section 455(a)
was amended in 1974, thus there can be no argument that the sections were pieces of compan-
ion legislation and thus should be read together." Hjelmfelt, supra note 21, at 262.
84. Presumably in every case where bias actually exists, there is an appearance of bias,
but not vice versa.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1982).
86. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3542, at 555-56; see, e.g., Sibla, 624 F.2d
at 867; United States v. IBM, 475 F. Supp. 1372, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
87. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3543, at 584; E. THODE, supra note 68, at
62.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1982).
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opinion" on the merits of the case.89
The issue of previous government service drew widespread pub-
lic attention in the early 1970's when Justice Rehnquist refused to
recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum.9" Prior to his appointment to the
Supreme Court, Rehnquist had worked for the Justice Department.
During that time, he appeared before a Senate committee and ex-
pressed opinions about an issue to be decided in Laird: the statu-
tory and constitutional authority of the executive branch to engage
in the gathering of secret information. He briefly mentioned Laird
v. Tatum, then before a court of appeals, in his testimony, but did
not address its merits. Despite this activity, Justice Rehnquist de-
cided that he was not disqualified because he never participated in
any way in the Justice Department's conduct of the case.91 The
writers of the leading treatise on federal civil procedure contend
that "this rather imprecise rule [non-disqualification unless the offi-
cial actively participated in the case before becoming a judge] ap-
pears to be consistent with the [amended] statute." 92
Section 455(b)(4) disqualifies a judge if he knows that he, his
spouse, or minor children living with him has a "financial interest in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding."93
The statute defines "financial interest" as "ownership of a legal or
equitable interest, however small."94 The courts have scrupulously
followed the statutory definition. If a judge or member of his imme-
diate family has any direct financial interest, no matter how small,
in a party, the judge must disqualify himself. As one court stated,
"[R]ecusal would be required if the judge owned even one share of
89. Id § 455(b)(3). With respect to expressing opinions, the subsection does not require
recusal "because of opinions on general propositions of law but only those that go to the
merit or lack of merit of a specific case." 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3544, at
588.
90. 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). See infra notes 115-21 and
accompanying text.
91. Laird, 409 U.S. at 828 (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). In his opinion, Justice
Rehnquist relied on a memo prepared by the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Justice
Department, which stated that a former Justice Department official was not disqualified from
hearing a case as a judge unless he "actively participated in [the] case or signed a pleading or
brief." Id.
92. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3544, at 589-90.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982). Thus, if a judge or a member of his immediate family
has any direct financial interest in the case, the judge must recuse himself. 13A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 15, § 3546, at 600-01; In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1308
(9th Cir. 1982) (judge recused himself because his wife's stock ownership constituted a finan-
cial interest in a party within § 455(b)(4)), aft'd mem. sub nom. Arizona v. United States
Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1982).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
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stock in a party to the litigation. ' '95 This rigid per se rule is a
sweeping change from the pre-1974 statute, which required a judge
to disqualify himself only if his financial interest was
"substantial. '9 6
Subsection (b)(4) also provides that a judge is disqualified if he
has "any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding."97 Nonfinancial interests-that is, any
interest other an ownership interest-in a case or party thus are
disqualifying only if substantial. Some commentators have argued
that this provision should apply only to pecuniary interests. They
have argued that "[n]oneconomic interests may affect a judge's abil-
ity to be, or to seem, impartial, but they can be handled adequately
under the general provision [section 455(a)] calling for disqualifica-
tion if the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 98
However, not all courts accept this analysis; some have held that
substantial noneconomic interests require disqualification under
section 455(b)(4) itself.99
The second approach appears better, since the first does not ad-
dress all situations deserving disqualification. A judge could have a
noneconomic interest that would be substantially affected by the
outcome of the case, but that would not cause his impartiality to be
questioned because it is known only by the judge and his immediate
family. For example, a judge hearing a school desegregation suit in
which the plaintiffs request busing as a remedy might be the parent
of a child who likely would be bused under the requested remedy.
This fact might not come to anyone's attention, yet it would clearly
cause the judge to have a substantial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.
For a nonfinancial interest to require disqualification under sec-
tion 455(b)(4), it probably must be unique to the judge or to a dis-
tinct group, rather than an interest shared equally with the general
public. A good example is In re New Mexico Natural Gas Litiga-
95. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980).
96. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (1982)); see, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1968) (judge who held 100 of 36,000,000 issued shares of stock in a party was not
disqualified).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982).
98. E. THODE, supra note 68, at 63, 66.
99. E.g., Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980)
("noneconomic interests may affect a judge's bias or prejudice"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1981). See also 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3547, at 605.
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tion.'00 There, a class of plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were
overpricing natural gas and sought a rollback in natural gas prices.
The trial judge recused himself, citing the latter part of section
455(b)(4). He reasoned that if the plaintiffs won, natural gas prices
would be reduced, and he would benefit as a consumer of natural
gas. The court of appeals held the recusal to be in error because
any benefit would be shared by the judge and the community. 101
When a judge shares an interest in the outcome of a case with a
large segment of the public, the court stated, public confidence in
the judicial system does not suffer if the judge hears the case. Fur-
ther, since so many litigated issues affect judges as members of the
public, it would be impractical to disqualify judges for this rea-
son.' 0 2 The expense of assigning a new judge to the case also trou-
bled the court since the proceedings already were very lengthy.10 3
In one special circumstance, a judge's interest in a case can
never result in disqualification. This occurs when a judge must sit
because of the common law "rule of necessity." The rule of neces-
sity requires the interested judge to hear the case if no other forum
is available and disqualification would result in the case not being
heard."° The rule of necessity operates, for example, when a case
affects the entire judiciary.
In United States v. Will,'0 5 the Supreme Court found that sec-
tion 455 did not abolish the rule of necessity.10 6 In that case, sev-
eral federal judges challenged the constitutionality of statutory
limitations on federal judicial salaries. All article III judges had an
100. 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 796.
102. Id. at 796-97.
103. Id. Cf. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1977). In Virginia
Electric, a power company sued to recover overcharges it allegedly paid to suppliers of com-
ponents for its nuclear power plants. If the plaintiff prevailed, it would pass on the savings to
all of its customers. Since the trial judge was a power company customer, he held himself
disqualified under § 455(b)(4). The court of appeals reversed, holding the "expectancy" of a
refund or cost savings in the future to be too remote and insubstantial to require disqualifica-
tion. See also Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 184 (D. Conn.
1968) (overruling disqualification because the benefit was frivolous).
The approach taken by the drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct to the provision that
was to become section 455(b)(4) was somewhat different. The Reporter's Notes state:
[A]t some point a relationship to a party as a utility customer, taxpayer, or pre-
mium payer should disqualify a judge. The test is that a judge should disqualify
himself if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect his interest as a
customer of the utility, as a taxpayer, or as a premium payer.
E. THODE, supra note 68, at 66-67.
104. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 217.
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interest in the outcome, as the Court pointed out, and all would be
disqualified by section 455 because of their interest in the subject
matter. 107 If section 455 disqualification applied, the case could not
be heard and the plaintiffs would be denied a forum. Therefore, the
rule of necessity demanded that no federal judge was disqualified.
The Court reasoned that section 455 had not abolished the rule.
The declared purpose of section 455 is to guarantee litigants a
fair forum in which they can pursue their claims. Far from pro-
moting this purpose, failure to apply the Rule of Necessity would
have contrary effect, for, without the Rule, some litigants would
be denied their right to a forum.'08
Finally, section 455(b)(5) mandates disqualification if the judge,
his spouse, or any of certain relatives is involved in the proceeding
before the judge.'09 This includes situations in which the judge,
spouse, or relative is a party or an officer of a party, is known by the
judge to have an interest that would be substantially affected by the
outcome, or is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding."10
Section 455 precludes a judge from accepting from the parties a
waiver of disqualification for any of the specific grounds listed in
subsection (b). Waiver is allowed if the disqualification is based on
the general provision of section 455(a), but such a waiver must be
"preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disquali-
fication.""' These provisions are a dramatic change from pre-1974
law, which allowed a party to waive disqualification by express con-
sent or by failure to request disqualification in a timely manner." 2
II. JUDICIAL BIAS AS A BASIS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
A. The Courts' Approach
Courts generally refuse to disqualify on the basis of "judicial
bias," that is, on the grounds a judge should be removed because of
his judicial philosophy, personal background, or prior opinions on
legal issues or the subject matter of the lawsuit." 3
107. Id. at 212.
108. Id. at 217.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (1982). The statute applies to relatives within the third degree
of relationship. Id.
110. See 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3548, at 607-09.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1982).
112. See 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3552, at 648-49. See also Thomas v.
United States, 363 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1966) (upholding defendant's waiver of objections to
sentencing judge's qualifications).
113. In this Article "judicial bias" is distinguished from bias toward or against a specific
party, which is termed "personal bias."
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1. General Legal Outlook and Judicial Philosophy
Before the 1974 amendments, it was well settled that federal
judges were free to decide cases involving legal issues or policy
questions on which they already had formed opinions. The judge's
general judicial philosophy also was not considered to be a basis for
disqualification. 114
A prominent example of these principles was Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in Laird v. Tatum.115 In Laird, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Army's collection of information
about activities believed to have potential for civil disorder. The
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote with Justice Rehnquist in the
majority, held that the jurisdiction of a federal court could not be
invoked by a plaintiff who claimed that the exercise of his first
amendment rights was chilled by the mere existence of an allegedly
unconstitutional government investigative activity not directed
against him.1 1
6
Following the Court's decision, the petitioners asked that Jus-
tice Rehnquist recuse himself, nunc pro tunc, because of earlier
statements he had made to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
constitutionality of government surveillance. These earlier state-
ments were contrary to the plaintiff's position. Justice Rehnquist
rejected this contention, saying, "none of the former Justices of this
Court since [the enactment of the judicial disqualification statute in]
1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves in cases
involving points of law with respect to which they had expressed an
opinion or formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench." '117
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on specific situations involving
other Supreme Court Justices as precedent for his action has been
criticized. The critics focus on the length of time between those
Justices' involvement in the subject and their decisions on the Court
114. See cases cited in Association of Natl Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1171 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15,
§ 3542, at 557-58.
115. 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
(Q . Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
409 U.S. at 831 (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). For support, Justice Rehnquist
cited the prior conduct of several Supreme Court Justices. Justice Black, for example, was
one of the principal authors of the Fair Labor Standards Act. "Nonetheless, he sat in the
case that upheld the constitutionality of the Act. . .and in later cases construing it." Id. at
831. Justice Frankfurter participated in several important labor law cases although he had
written extensively in the field and played a large part in the drafting of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. Id. at 832. Rehnquist also cited the participation of Justice Jackson in a case even
though it raised exactly the same issue he had decided as Attorney General. Id.
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and point out that none of those Justices had "been involved with,
or suggested the proper resolution of, a specific case upon which
they eventually ruled."11 Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand,
publicly expressed his opinion on the issue to be decided in Laird
less than two years before the Supreme Court decision.
Further, his refusal to disqualify himself has especially trouble-
some implications for the integrity of the judiciary as an institution.
Justice Rehnquist expressed his opinion on the issue as a member of
the political branch of government and on behalf of the govern-
ment. He then, as a member of the judiciary, ruled on the same
issue in favor of the government. Such actions may cause
"[r]easonable men [to] question not only the impartiality of judges
but also the independence of courts from the political branches and
the ability of the judiciary to perform its role of protecting against
abuses of power by those branches."" 9
Justice Rehnquist argued that disqualification of a Justice for
prior legal opinions would be improper and nonsensical. He noted
that Supreme Court Justices normally have formed and presented
opinions concerning constitutional issues before coming to the
Court. Indeed, he said, "Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he
joined the court was a complete tabula rosa in the area of constitu-
tional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias."12
The need to avoid inefficiencies in the administration of the judi-
cial system, especially at the Supreme Court level, also played a role
in Justice Rehnquist's decision to participate. He noted that dis-
qualification of one Justice would result in affirmance of the lower
court opinion by an equally divided court, leaving the principle of
law in the case unsettled. To Justice Rehnquist, "The undesirability
of such a disposition is . . . a reason for not 'bending over back-
wards' to deem oneself disqualified." '
Justice Rehnquist certainly was not the first to refuse to disqual-
ify himself on the grounds of prior legal opinion and judicial philos-
ophy. Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1943 wrote an eloquent defense of this principle:
If. . . "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total ab-
sence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has
ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even
118. Note, supra note 53, at 123.
119. Note, supra note 8, at 764 n.120.
120. Laird, 409 U.S. at 835 (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
121. Id. at 837-38.
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at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predis-
positions; and the process of education, formal and informal, cre-
ates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations,
attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and
which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices. Without acquired
"slants," pre-conceptions, life could not go on. . . . The stan-
dard of dispassionateness obviously does not require the judge to
rid himself of the unconscious influence of such social attitudes.
In addition to those acquired social value judgments, every
judge, however, has many unavoidable idiosyncratic "learnings
of the mind," uniquely personal prejudices which may interfere
with his fairness . . . . The conscientious judge will, as far as
possible, make himself aware of his biases of this character, and,
by that very self-knowledge, nullify their effect. Much harm is
done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and
taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human
and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless
thinking machine.1 2
2
Disqualifying a judge because of his general legal philosophy or
point of view is clearly impractical and nonsensical. All judges have
acquired predispositions and philosophies that affect their behavior
on and off the bench. Such predispositions should not be grounds
for disqualification. As one commentator stated: "[I]nsofar as a
judge has developed a consistent judicial philosophy, he might be
said to have prejudged the legal issues involved in a particular case.
Arguably, under these circumstances his impartiality could reason-
ably be questioned. . . [but disqualification for this reason] would
preclude consistent and rational functioning by the judiciary." 123
That judges have developed legal philosophies and opinions is
accepted and inherent in the judicial system. Indeed, those nomi-
nated to become federal judges often are chosen precisely because
they are believed to have certain legal philosophies and outlooks.
Once a judge is in office, it is expected, and in fact desired, that he
will develop an individual outlook and point of view, a general judi-
cial philosophy. Yet any "consistent and predictable judicial phi-
losophy demands that a judge have certain preconceptions on
matters of legal principle, even though they may disadvantage a
party."' 124 Disqualification, then, cannot be the solution in the ordi-
nary situation of predisposition due to a judge's general legal philos-
ophy. However, this conclusion that refusal to disqualify on the
basis of general judicial philosophy is sensible does not validate Jus-
122. In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (footnotes omitted).
123. Note, supra note 8, at 757 (footnotes omitted).
124. Comment, supra note 2, at 252.
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tice Rehnquist's action in Laird. The problem presented there-
whether a judge should disqualify himself when he has formed an
opinion on specific legal issues as applied in a specific factual con-
text before hearing a case-is much more difficult to resolve. That
issue will be referred to shortly.
2. The Judge's Personal Background and Experience
A judge's personal background or previous associations gener-
ally are not considered to show bias requiring disqualification. "[A]
judge is not prevented from sitting because he comes into every case
with a background of general personal experiences and beliefs."' 25
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers 126 provides a good example. There, the plaintiffs filed a civil
rights suit challenging alleged employment discrimination against
blacks in the construction industry.' 27 The trial judge, Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., was black. Moreover, he had studied and
written extensively in the field of race relations before and while on
the bench.128 The defendants moved to disqualify him for bias,
based on a speech in which he stated his strong support for the civil
rights movement.129
Judge Higginbotham refused to recuse himself, stating that he
was not biased for or against any of the parties to the lawsuit.'30 If
black judges could be disqualified from hearing racial discrimina-
tion suits brought by blacks because of presumed bias in favor of the
plaintiffs, he said, then only white judges could hear such suits. 13 1
Then, however, the white judges would be open to the charge that
they were biased in favor of the white defendants.
Very similar was Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell.'31 In Blank,
the plaintiff applied for a position as an attorney with the defendant
law firm but was not hired. She sued on the grounds of sex discrim-
ination. The trial judge was a black woman who previously had
worked as a plaintiff's attorney in civil rights litigation. 33 Before
coming to the bench, the judge had made public statements oppos-
125. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 388 (1st Cir. 1961).
126. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
127. Id. at 157.
128. Id. at 157, 168.
129. Id. at 157.
130. Id. at 160.
131. Id. at 165.
132. 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
133. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 35:662
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
ing both racial and sex discrimination.' This judge also refused to
recuse herself, holding that her personal background was an insuffi-
cient ground.135
The 1974 statutory revision did not change this principle of re-
fusing to disqualify because of personal background. Some might
argue that certain aspects of a judge's personal background create
an appearance of bias in certain cases, for example, when a former
civil rights attorney hears an employment discrimination case.
However, the courts have not adopted that approach. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, stated that "all judges come
to the bench with a background of experiences, associations and
viewpoints. This background alone is seldom sufficient in itself to
provide a reasonable basis for recusal."'
136
A prominent example of the unchanged judicial approach was
State of Idaho v. Freeman. 37 The plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of Congress' extension of the date for ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). 38 The district court judge hear-
ing the case had been an executive officer of the Mormon Church
until six months after the suit was filed.' 3 9 The Mormon Church
not only strongly and publicly opposed the adoption of the ERA,
but also "opposed. . .the propriety of the extension of the ratifica-
tion period. ' '" 4° The party seeking disqualification, contending that
the extension was constitutional, argued that Judge Callister's for-
mer position in the Mormon Church created a reasonable question
of his impartiality.141 The judge refused to recuse himself, stating
that he never publicly revealed his feelings about the ERA nor pro-
moted the church's position.' 42 He analogized his situation to the
general principle that a consistent legal philosophy developed
through experience and training that results in "preconceptions re-
garding matters of legal principle. . . should not be taken as dem-
onstrating a disqualifying bias nor as an appearance of
impartiality."' 14 3 This principle is only partially persuasive in Free-
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10, 11 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(trial judge graduated from university that was the defendant in the case; recusal not re-
quired), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
137. 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981).
138. Id. at 710.
139. See id. at 731.
140. Id. at 731.
141. Id. at 710.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 728.
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man, since it was the judge's religious background and beliefs, not
his legal philosophy, that the party asserted as the basis for disquali-
fication. 11 Judge Callister also claimed that section 455(a) required
a narrow reading to prevent judge-shopping and to promote judicial
economy. 145
Judge Callister was correct that religious background alone
should not be a proper basis for disqualification. Otherwise, a Jew-
ish judge, for instance, could not hear cases affecting Jewish inter-
ests, such as the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, nor could
Catholic judges sit in cases affecting Catholics as a group. A judge's
religious background, like his race or ethnic background, should
not be presumed to affect his ability to execute his judicial duties
faithfully and impartially. 146
The issue of a judge's personal background also was addressed
in Paschall v. Mayone. 47 A black prisoner brought a civil rights
suit as a result of beatings he allegedly had received in jail.148 The
defendant requested that the trial judge recuse herself because she
was a former general counsel of the NAACP.'49 The judge denied
the disqualification motion.' She ruled that disqualification was
inappropriate in such circumstances because it "would require a
judge to disqualify himself in any suit dealing with the general sub-
ject matter with which he dealt in practice prior to ascending the
bench."' 5
The refusal to disqualify for personal background, like the re-
fusal to disqualify for general judicial philosophy, is sensible. As one
commentator stated: "The theory of de facto bias has no place in
144. Id. at 710.
145.
[A] broad or liberal application of section 455(a) appears to be against the spirit of
section 455. For example, if a judge disqualifies himself on mere application, or
mere allegation that his appearance of impartiality might be questioned, it would
make the nonpreemptive statute in effect preemptive and encourage judge-shopping
which is clearly against the mandate of the statute's legislative history.
507 F. Supp. at 733.
146. These comments assume the judge is not actually biased because of his religion. If
he is, disqualification obviously is proper.
It also must be remembered that the statute, to preserve public confidence in the judici-
ary, requires disqualification whenever a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances,
would question the judge's impartiality. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text. In
certain cases, it may be possible for a judge to have religious beliefs that would lead a reason-
able person to doubt his impartiality.
147. 454 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
148. Id. at 1292-93.
149. Id. at 1299.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1301 (emphasis in original).
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disqualification law. . .. Such simplistic allegations of bias would
reduce the judicial system to a shambles and have rightfully been
given short shrift by judges so challenged." ' 2 Disqualification is
unnecessary as long as judges disregard whatever special interests
they represented before coming to the bench. Prior experiences
merely shape a judge's general legal and political outlook, and as
such are insufficient to support disqualification.
3. Prior Views on Legal Issues and the Merits of the Case
A much more difficult issue is involved when a judge previously
has formed a specific opinion about some aspect of the case in dis-
pute. Prior judicial views on pending litigation take several differ-
ent forms. The judge's views may or may not be publicly known
and may have been expressed in a formal judicial opinion or in an
out-of-court speech, writing, or testimony. They may relate to spe-
cific disputed legal issues or to the overall subject matter of the case.
The most serious situation is one where a judge has prior, pub-
licly known views on the law as applied to the specific factual set-
ting of an upcoming case. Such a circumstance seems not only to
deny the party opposed to the judge's stated views the appearance
of an impartial tribunal, but to undermine public confidence in the
judiciary. Yet traditionally, even this type of predisposition does
not disqualify the judge, being merely judicial and not personal
bias.153
The Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Cement In-
stitute154 followed this principle. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) had ruled that the defendant's pricing system violated the
Sherman Act. Prior to the FTC's decision, several Commissioners
testified before a congressional committee that they believed such
pricing systems generally were illegal restraints of trade. The
Supreme Court, applying judicial disqualification standards, held
that the prior opinions did not disqualify the Commissioners. The
Court maintained that disqualifying the Commissioners for their
past opinions would effectively make experience a handicap instead
of an advantage and thus discourage development of expertise. 151
Justice Black, writing for the Court, concluded:
[No decision] of this Court would require us to hold that it was a
152. Note, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1445, 1461 (1981).
153. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
154. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
155. Id. at 702.
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violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case
after he had expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of
conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try
the same case more than once and decide identical issues each
time, although these issues involve questions both of law and
fact. 15
6
The general attitude of the courts has been that a judge is never
disqualified for his prior judicial views. This principle partially re-
flects a desire to develop a more expert judiciary that will decide
cases more efficiently. 157
Another example of the refusal to recuse when a judge has
stated his views on the subject matter of the suit in a prior case
occurred in Deal v. Warner.'58 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that
hair length regulations imposed on persons serving in the military
were unconstitutional. 159 In a previous case, the trial judge had
stated that lawsuits about hair length did not belong in the federal
courts. Denying the plaintiff's request that he recuse himself, the
judge held that "prior adverse judicial determinations involving
. . . the same issue in question are insufficient as a basis for
disqualification.' 161
A more extreme example is found in Antonello v. Wunsch. 16 1
The plaintiff was in federal court attacking the constitutionality of a
doctrine adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court rejecting govern-
mental immunity for negligence in proprietary state activities. The
trial judge had been a member of the Kansas Supreme Court and
voted in the majority when it handed down the decision in dispute.
If there ever was a situation when disqualification was appropriate
for a prior in-court judicial opinion, surely this was such a case.'62
The trial judge was being asked to determine the constitutionality of
his own past decision. Yet the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial judge's decision not to recuse himself. The court
simply restated the proposition that "the fact that a judge has previ-
ously expressed himself on a particular point of law is not sufficient
156. Id. at 702-03.
157. See, e.g., In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 388 (lst Cir. 1961) ("[lit would
be strange if a judge became less qualified the greater his judicial experience.").
158. 369 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 177.
161. 500 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1974).
162. This case was not governed by § 47 because that section only forbids situations
where a judge hears a direct appeal of a case already heard by him. See 13A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 15, § 3545, at 595.
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to show personal bias or prejudice." '163 This stark case demon-
strates that a judge will almost never be disqualified on the basis of a
previous in-court opinion.
In Lawton v. Tarr,1 the judge's views were expressed in an out-
of-court speech. The plaintiff challenged the legality of his being
drafted into the military, claiming exemption under the selective
service law. The trial judge previously had stated his "vehement
opposition" to the Vietnam War.165 Based on that statement, the
defendant draft board requested that the judge recuse himself. The
trial judge denied the motion, saying "[t]he beginning of intellectual
honesty in a judge is the recognition that, like other men, he has his
own predilections and preferences and intellectual and philosophi-
cal attitudes that color and influence his viewpoints." '16 6 He added
that "it is hornbook law" that the attitudes or feelings a judge has
toward the subject matter of a case should not disqualify him.' 67
These cases occurred before the 1974 amendments.: The amend-
ments to section 455 could be construed to compel changes in the
doctrine of not requiring recusal on the grounds of a judge's prior
beliefs relevant to the case before him. Intended to broaden the
scope of disqualification, section 455(a) requires disqualification
whenever the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." '68 Certainly the existence of a previously stated opinion on
an important issue to be decided in the current case or an opinion
concerning the case's subject matter could lead a reasonable per-
son16 9 to question the judge's impartiality. Since section 455(a) is
an independent ground for judicial disqualification, personal bias
163. 500 F.2d at 1262.
164. 327 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
165. Id. at 671.
166. Id. at 671-72.
167. Id. at 673; accord United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1976) (district
judge not disqualified on motion that simply established that affiant did not like the judge and
had publicly expressed his dislike; mere showing of judge's prior expression on particular law
also not sufficient to show personal bias); Goodpasture v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760, 765 (6th Cir.
1970) (action by property owner challenging eminent domain power of TVA; trial judge not
disqualified although he had written law review article about federal and state condemnation
proceedings); Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 430 (10th Cir. 1966) ("[I]t is not
sufficient [to require disqualification] to show that there exists a prejudice or bias based on the
judge's previously expressed view of the law."); Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 646 (9th
Cir. 1956) (proof of judge's prior expression of opinion on a legal question, without showing
particular facts indicating personal bias against a party, insufficient to disqualify under
§ 144).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
169. Disqualification is supposed to be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable
person. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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need not be found for disqualification under the amended statute. 170
In addition, while refusal to recuse on the basis of prior opinion
as to the issues or subject matter in dispute is well established, it is
not unchallenged. A different approach was taken in a seldom-cited
opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission v. Pol-
lak.17 1 The case involved a first amendment challenge to the play-
ing of radio programs on loudspeakers installed in Washington
public buses and streetcars. Justice Frankfurter recused himself sua
sponte and wrote a separate opinion explaining his reasons.1 72 He
said he strongly disliked the piped-in radio programs on buses and
street cars and believed he was therefore biased against the defend-
ants. Justice Frankfurter said:
When there is ground for believing that ... unconscious feelings
may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may ... unfairly lead
others to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves
* . . The guiding consideration is that the administration of
justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be
so in fact. This case for me presents such a situation. My feel-
ings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in contro-
versy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon
it.173
The principle Justice Frankfurter articulated is sound, but
whether other judges follow it is doubtful. In United States v.
Townsend,174 a conscientious objector was convicted of failing to
report for military induction. The trial judge stated at a pretrial
conference that he had a policy of sentencing all selective service
violators, whether conscientious objectors or not, to thirty months
in prison as a way of inducing them to enlist. In a rare instance of a
court taking an approach similar to Justice Frankfurter's, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds
that the comments showed the judge was biased and should have
recused himself.175 As the other cases previously discussed indi-
170. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have ruled that § 455(a) must be governed
by the same standard as § 144 and § 455(b)(1). See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text. Under such a view only personal bias is a proper basis for disqualification. This ap-
proach, though, is probably an incorrect interpretation of the statute. See supra notes 80-83
and accompanying text.
171. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
172. Id. at 466-67 (statement of Frankfurter, J.). Frankfurter said that he believed judges
should state reasons when they recuse themselves. Id. at 467 (statement of Frankfurter, J.).
This practice has not been followed among Supreme Court Justices, who very rarely state
their reasons for disqualifying themselves.
173. Id. at 467 (statement of Frankfurter, J.).
174. 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973).
175. Id. at 1074.
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cate, however, courts seldom follow Frankfurter's approach favor-
ing recusal.
The drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on which the
amended section 455 is based,176 rejected any change in the princi-
ple that a judge's prior opinion on the issues in dispute or subject
matter of the case is insufficient to require disqualification. At one
stage in its drafting, Canon 3C(1)(a) required disqualification if a
judge "had a fixed belief concerning the merits." '177 The drafters
were concerned that this language could be interpreted to require a
judge's recusal if he had a fixed belief about the law applicable to a
case. 7' They believed that such a requirement would conflict with
the necessity for judges to have established opinions concerning
many areas of the law, and consequently they removed the lan-
guage. 17 9 The standard they adopted was that of personal bias or
prejudice. 80
This history should not be given too much significance, how-
ever, because it is attributable to Canon 3C(l)(a), the subsection
Congress enacted as section 455(b)(1), which contains the "personal
bias" language. Congress made a significant change in Canon 3C
by enacting section 455(a) as an independent general standard. The
legislative history explicitly states that section 455(a) was set apart
from section 455(b) to provide an independent ground for judicial
176. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
177. E. THODE, supra note 68, at 61. Canon 3C(1)(a) as adopted provides:
A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings ....
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1980).
178. E. THODE, supra note 68, at 61. The Reporter's Notes stated:
Subsection (a) has gone through several formulations in drafting. At one time the
language provided for disqualification if a judge "had a fixed belief concerning the
merits." It was intended that a judge disqualify himself if he had made up his mind
on the merits before he heard the case. The Committee was confronted, however,
by the interpretation of many able judges and law professors that that would require
a judge to disqualify himself if he had a fixed belief about the law applicable to a
given case. For example, it was argued that a judge with a fixed belief that the First
Amendment precludes libel action by a public official against a newspaper in the
absence of proof of malice should disqualify himself in a libel case of that general
character. This interpretation was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized
the necessity and the value of judges' having fixed beliefs about constitutional prin-
ciples and many other facets of the law. As a result of the apparent ambiguity of
the proposed language, the Committee adopted instead the standard of "personal
bias or prejudice."
Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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disqualification.' " The specific circumstances listed in section
455(b) were not intended to be exclusive. Instead, a judge also may
be disqualified in any situation, in the language of section 455(a), in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
1 2
Despite this broad language, federal judges have continued to
refuse to disqualify themselves for their prior views no matter what
the circumstances. This is illustrated by the 1981 decision of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Phillips v. Joint Legislative Com-
mittee.1 3 Phillips was a class action in which the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendants, various Mississippi state agencies, discrimi-
nated against blacks in employment. One of the plaintiffs moved to
disqualify the trial judge on the grounds he was biased against
blacks and hostile to civil rights suits. The moving party cited sev-
eral of the judge's rulings, quotations from his opinions, and re-
marks from the bench. The trial judge refused to disqualify
himself.'84
On appeal, the court of appeals admitted that "at times. . . [the
trial judge's] remarks reflected racial reactions not only outmoded
but improper." '185 The court nevertheless held that the trial judge
acted within his discretion in denying the motion to recuse, citing
the rule that ordinarily a judge is not disqualified for his judicial
tendencies or attitudes.'86 The court said the rule was necessary to
insulate judges from repeated successful disqualification motions.
The court feared that if a judge were confronted with such a possi-
bility, his actions would not be governed solely by the cases before
him.I87 Noting that judges' prior views inevitably affect their deci-
sions, the court concluded that "[a] judge is not a computing
machine, and the judicial system is not constructed so that each
judge must reach the same result as all other judges in a given
case."
188
The court's holding in Phillips reveals an important reason for
the courts' extreme reluctance to disqualify for prior in-court state-
ments. Judges should not be afraid to act in a consistent manner in
181. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6355. In regard to the legislation enacted as
section 455 in 1974, the report stated that "[t]hese specific situations in subsection (b) are in
addition to the general standard set forth in subsection (a)." Id.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
183. 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 971 (1982).
184. Id. at 1018.
185. Id. at 1020.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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similar cases. Indeed, consistency is desirable because it helps pro-
mote stability in law and predictability of result. Further, judges
should decide cases on their merits, rather than try to balance out
their decisions on cases raising similar legal issues. The Phillips
court, however, added a caveat. "[We do not] say that a clearly
evinced policy of disregarding the merits in any class of cases can
withstand a recusal motion . . . . [We merely] caution against a
district judge disqualifying himself on the basis of an allegation of a
perceived history of rulings that a moving party dislikes."
18 9
Still another example of the continuing vitality of the principle
of nondisqualification based on a judge's prior views"' is the hold-
ing of the Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. ' 91
In that case, the issue was whether a "loan guarantee fee" charged
by a bank actually represented interest and therefore violated the
Arkansas usury statute. The trial judge's remark that he believed
the state usury statute to be "harsh" was held not to have disquali-
fied him.192 "The judge merely expressed a viewpoint concerning a
legal issue. . . and nothing from an extrajudicial source occurred
which could taint his viewpoint."' 93
In Smith v. Danyo,I94 the trial judge refused to recuse himself in
a personal injury suit, even though he previously had stated that he
did not believe that diversity personal injury litigation belonged in
the federal courts. He relied on the traditional doctrine that a pre-
vious expression of opinion concerning a point of law or the subject
189. Id. at 1021.
190. See, eg., Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1982) (trial judge
not required to recuse himself from case in which he decided how much to award in contin-
gent attorney's fees when he had previously written and spoken on the subject); United States
v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1385 (9th Cir. 1981) (appeal of conviction for possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute; trial judge's statement that marijuana has a "cancerlike" effect
on society did not mandate disqualification), cert denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1982); United States
v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1979) (judge's past in-court statements regarding
displeasure with marijuana traffickers was merely judicial, not personal, bias which did not
require recusal); United States v. Gignax, 605 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1979) (trial judge not
disqualified from tax evasion trial even though defendant alleged the judge strongly disliked
tax protesters); United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); United
States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D. Nev. 1978) ("[The judge's views on particular
legal issues do not support an inference of bias against a party sufficient to require recusal."),
aff'd, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1981); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 517-18 (D.S.C. 1955) (neither a judge's prior ex-
pression of judicial opinion nor expressions of personal opinions in current case warrant
recusal).
191. 659 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1981).
192. Id. at 869.
193. Id.
194. 441 F. Supp. 171 (M.D. Pa. 1977), affid, 585 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1978).
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matter of a case is insufficient grounds for disqualification. 95 The
judge's prior opinion did not go to the merits of the case, but to the
advisability of diversity jurisdiction in general. In affirming, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this and said "there is a
world of difference between a charge of bias against a party as a
member of a class and a bias in favor of a particular legal
principle." 19 6
B. Deficiencies of the Present Approach and Suggested Reforms
Despite the broad language of section 455(a), courts have con-
tinued to distinguish between judicial and personal bias, and have
generally refused to recuse for any form of judicial bias.' 97 The
question remains whether this approach is ethically proper and
comports with the mandate of section 455(a). Refusal to recuse be-
cause of a judge's general legal philosophy and personal background
is clearly appropriate; every judge inevitably develops some general
judicial outlook and undergoes some relevant prior personal exper-
iences. In addition, a strong argument can be made that disqualifi-
cation is improper when a judge has previously stated his opinion
on a legal issue in court while deciding a previous case. Stating an
opinion on a legal issue, whether or not as part of a formal written
opinion, and then following it is nothing more than a form of prece-
dent. The American judicial system encourages adhering to prece-
dent in order to promote stability in the law, principled
decisionmaking, and predictability of result. Even though a party
may believe that by adhering to his previous in-court opinions a
judge is prejudiced against that party's legal position, such concerns
are outweighed by the benefits of following precedent. 198
However, the proper approach for dealing with other types of
195. "The mere fact that a judge has previously expressed himself on a particular point of
law is not sufficient to show personal bias or prejudice. . . . An attitude or feeling a judge
may entertain towards the subject matter of a case does not disqualify him." 441 F. Supp. at
180.
196. 585 F.2d at 87.
197. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly summarized the basic rule against
recusal for any form ofjudicial bias. "[J]udges are free to decide cases involving policy ques-
tions on which they previously have expressed a view . . . . [A] federal judge will not be
disqualified pursuant to [§ 144 or § 455] because of prior expression of views on a legal ques-
tion." Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1171-72 n.51 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (dictum), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
198. This does not mean that previous in-court statements can never be a basis for dis-
qualification. As the court in Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1020-21
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 971 (1982), pointed out, if such statements show a
judge is likely to disregard the merits of a case, he should be disqualified.
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judicial bias is not as clear nor as simple to resolve as current doc-
trine holds.1 99 The problem is most difficult when the judge previ-
ously has formed an opinion on an issue to be litigated, and his view
is publicly known. The judge's predisposition will cause the party
asserting the adverse proposition to doubt the judge's impartiality.
It likely would have the same effect on a reasonable observer aware
of the situation.
20 0
While avoidance of judge-shopping, protection of judicial re-
sources, and maintenance of an expert judiciary are goals well
served by the courts' present approach, another fundamental inter-
est should not be ignored. This is the need to ensure public confi-
dence in the judicial system.201 Since the judiciary's authority
depends on public confidence in the impersonality and reasoned
foundation of judicial decisions, it is essential that judges be disqual-
ified whenever the public may reasonably question their impartial-
ity. 202 This principle was codified in section 455(a).20 3 The federal
courts' present approach to judicial bias, that even prior out-of-
court opinions on an issue being litigated are not sufficient for dis-
qualification, frequently appears to conflict with this goal of ensur-
ing the appearance of judicial impartiality. This approach is
inconsistent with the spirit, and arguably the terms, of section
455(a).204
199. As one commentator has said: "[Tihe rules for disqualification for bias have intro-
duced the most difficult question in disqualification law: How human may a judge be and still
be allowed to judge?" Note, supra note 152, at 1461.
200. For example, a reasonable person probably would not think the judge in Deal v.
Warner, 369 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1973), was impartial toward the merits of the case.
After all, he had stated that he did not think that cases involving challenges to hair length
regulations belonged in the federal courts, and he inevitably would have to decide exactly this
issue during the litigation.
201.
The protection of judicial integrity and dignity from any hint or appearance of bias
is the foundation of our judicial system. Therefore, it is imperative that a judge
withdraw when there is the slightest suspicion of bias, rather than continue and
possibly jeopardize the judicial process. To preserve public confidence in the judici-
ary, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
Note, Idaho v. Freeman: Judicial Disqualification: The Effect of Religious Leadership on
Judicial Impartiality, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 243, 254-55 (1981) (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
202. Note, supra note 8, at 764.
203. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
204. As one commentator noted:
Can it be contended that full confidence on the part of litigants is present where the
case is tried before a judge who has prejudged the issues? If the element of public
confidence in the administration of justice is important . . . then there is every
reason for concluding that a judge who has prejudged is a biased judge . ...
While a judge should not be disqualified merely because he has expressed opinions
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The present approach simply labels as nondisqualifying judicial
bias everything a judge has said or believed about legal issues, no
matter how closely connected to the issues or subject matter in dis-
pute. Such an approach is unsatisfactory from either an ethical or
statutory point of view. It ignores the essential need to maintain
public confidence in the judiciary by achieving the appearance of
judicial impartiality. A different approach is necessary to meet this
fundamental consideration as well as to comply with the intent and
language of section 455(a).
Prejudgment of the legal merits of the case is the easiest situa-
tion to resolve. When the prejudgment involves the application of
law to specific facts in a particular case, disqualification is appropri-
ate. "Unlike the development by judges of consistent views on legal
principles, prior formulation or expression of opinion on the merits
of a pending case is not an activity which the public expects of
on a legal subject, still where his opinions relate to the very case he is to try, the
appearance of full impartiality is not present.
Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts, 11 U. PrTr. L. REv. 415,
420 (1950). An interesting example of the difficulties presented by the current approach is
found today in the Supreme Court. Whenever the Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal
of a criminal defendant given the death penalty, for whatever reason, Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissent from the denial of certiorari with the following statement: "Adhering to our
views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231 (1971),
we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case." E.g., McDougall v.
North Carolina, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983) (emphasis added). See also cases reported in 104 S. Ct.
198-204 (1983).
The Justices clearly have prejudged the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty.
Some might contend that this is just a reflection of their political philosophy and thus is not
disqualifying. Another argument could be that since it is an official judicial opinion, it is akin
to precedent, albeit in a dissenting opinion. On the other hand, it might be argued that this is
a prejudgment of the legal issues to be decided and raises questions of impartiality. The
contention that it is not disqualifying is correct if the issue being appealed is the constitution-
ality of the death penalty. Supreme Court Justices frequently adhere to constitutional opin-
ions in dissent after dissent that a majority of their brethren will not adopt. However, if the
subject in such a case were not the merits of the death penalty itself but rather, for example,
the legality of the jury selection at the defendant's trial, the two Justices' views as to the
constitutionality of the death penalty clearly affect their decision on whether to grant certio-
rari. In such a circumstance, serious questions could be raised as to the two Justices' imparti-
ality.
See also Comment, Disqualification of Judges for Bias or Prejudice-A New Approach,
1972 UTAH L. REV. 448, 451.
Assuming ... that public confidence in the judiciary is a proper objective of a
disqualification procedure, then it is no answer to a litigant that the alleged bias or
prejudice is not "personal." Bias is an elusive attitude and a judge may not be
aware of its effect. Since a judge's inability to abstract evidence from preconceived
opinion may be too subtle for him to detect or for a litigant to prove, a litigant's
reasonable apprehension, based on the facts, should be sufficient for disqualification.
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judges or has reason to encourage. ' 2 °-
While prejudgment of the merits of the case clearly should dis-
qualify a judge, it is more difficult to resolve the situation where a
judge holds an opinion prior to the litigation about specific legal
issues in dispute. Rather than the current blanket refusal to con-
sider this a basis for disqualification, a case-by-case approach to de-
termine whether an appearance of bias exists is preferable. Factors
that should be considered in determining whether recusal is appro-
priate include whether and how widely the judge's views are pub-
licly known, how strongly the views are held, whether the proper
resolution of the legal issue is unsettled, and whether his views re-
late to the legal issue as applied in the specific factual context of the
case or the law in a more general sense.
Such cases also could be referred to a different judge to deter-
mine if disqualification is warranted.2" 6 Currently the courts dis-
courage referral, citing the delay and administrative inconvenience,
and arguing that the challenged judge is more familiar with the al-
leged bias.207 Yet referral in cases of a judge's prior views would
comport more closely with the objective standard of section
455(a).20 8 The appearance of impartiality also would be enhanced if
another judge found that his colleague would be able to set aside his
prior views and adjudicate fairly in the current case. Even if refer-
ral would cause delay and administrative burdens, the price may be
worth paying to enhance the appearance of judicial impartiality. It
is doubtful that a party requesting disqualification is ever convinced
by a judge's own ruling that he is impartial. Because parties proba-
bly would be less likely to appeal findings of impartiality made inde-
pendently by another judge, the overall administrative burden in
fact might not increase.
205. Note, supra note 8, at 758.
206. Several commentators have advocated this reform. See, eg., Comment, Disqualifi-
cation of Federal District Court Judges for Bias or Prejudice" Problems, Problematic Proposals,
and a Proposed Procedure, 46 ALB. L. REv. 229, 247 (1981); Note, Disqualification of Judges
for Bias in the Federal Courts, supra note 33, at 1439.
207. Eg., Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983).
208. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6354-55. As a practical matter, it is difficult
to imagine how any judge can be truly objective in determining whether his own conduct
creates an appearance of impartiality in a reasonable person.
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III. FINANCIAL INTEREST AS A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION
A. The Present Statutory Approach
The disqualification statute treats recusal based on financial in-
terest directly opposite from the courts' approach to disqualification
for judicial bias. If a judge has any "financial interest,"2 9 however
small, in a party to the proceeding or the subject matter in contro-
versy, he is automatically disqualified. 10 The ownership of even
one share of stock in a corporation that is a party to a case requires
disqualification. 11 This strict rule applies as well to any member of
the judge's immediate family who has such a financial interest.2 "2
While a judge is disqualified only for financial interests that he
knows exist,2 1 3 the statute provides that "[a] judge should inform
himself about his personal and fiduciary interests, and make a rea-
sonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial inter-
ests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household." '14
The legislative history specifically affirms that a federal judge is free
to invest, but warns that he should follow the guidelines of Canon
5C(3) of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct21 and invest in compa-
nies "which are not likely to become litigants in his court." ' 6 Ob-
viously, if such a company appeared before the judge, he would
have to disqualify himself.217
When Congress adopted this per se rule, it suggested that the
209. "Financial interest" is defined by the statute to mean "ownership of a legal or equi-
table interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant
in the affairs of a party." 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (1982).
210. Id. § 455(b)(4); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.), aiffd mem.
sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1982); In re New Mexico
Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note
52, at 6356; 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3546, at 600-01.
This strict rule is a sharp change from the rule that existed prior to the 1974 amendments,
which employed a substantial interest test to determine if disqualification was warranted. See
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982)).
211. New Mexico Natural Gas, 620 F.2d at 796.
212. "Immediate family" refers to a judge's spouse and minor children living with him.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982).
213. Id. § 455(b)(4).
214. Id. § 455(c).
215. Canon 5C(3) provides: "A judge should manage his investments and other financial
interests to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. As soon as he can do so
without serious financial detriment, he should divest himself of investments and other finan-
cial interests that might require frequent disqualification." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5C(3) (1980).
216. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6357.
217. Id.
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rule was constitutionally mandated.21 In 1927, the Supreme Court
found that a criminal defendant's due process rights are violated if
the presiding judicial officer has "the slightest pecuniary interest" in
the outcome.219 This ruling, however, came in a case where the
facts were rather extreme-the presiding officer, also the town
mayor, received a portion of the court fees only if the defendant was
convicted. 22 1 It is doubtful that a per se rule of disqualification for a
judge's minor financial interest in a party is constitutionally re-
quired in an ordinary civil case. Until the 1974 amendments, dis-
qualification was required only if the judge's financial interest in the
case was "substantial. ' 221 In the many cases applying the pre-1974
rule, the substantial interest test was never held unconstitutional.222
A more compelling reason for rejecting the substantial interest
test was stated in the committee report to the 1974 amendments.
The change, according to the report, was made to avoid "the uncer-
tainty and ambiguity about what is a 'substantial interest.' "223
Similarly, the drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct found this
consideration important.224
Automatic disqualification avoids the problems of ambiguity
and uncertainty. A per se rule provides administrative ease by elim-
inating the need to determine when interests are large enough to
influence a judge's decisions. Proponents of such a rule argue that
it does not impose any hardships on a judge when the financial in-
terests are small, since he has the option of divestment to avoid
disqualification.225
218. Id. at 6356.
219. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1924). See also Commonwealth Castings Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that arbitrators must disclose to
parties dealings that might create an impression of possible bias in order to avoid later invali-
dation of decision).
220. 273 U.S. at 524.
221. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
222. See, eg., cases collected in Comment, supra note 203, at 382-83.
223. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6356.
224. E. THODE, supra note 68, at 65-66.
A further reason for rejecting the "substantial interest" test was its ambiguity.
Does "substantial" mean that the judge's financial interest in the party is to be
compared to the total of all financial interests in the party? On such a basis, one
hundred shares of AT&T stock compared to the total number of shares outstanding
might well be considered insubstantial. But what if the one hundred shares repre-
sent all of the judge's assets? Surely this is substantial from the judge's point of view
, * **Administering the "substantial interest" standard could result in great un-
certainty or an invasion of the personal financial privacy to which the Committee
felt a judge is entitled.
Id.
225. Note, supra note 8, at 752.
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Another motivation for adoption of the per se rule may have
been the Watergate scandal. Although the scandal did not involve
judicial wrongdoing, it did create strong public demand for a higher
standard of ethics in government generally. Demands for reform
also followed the controversy surrounding the nomination of Judge
Clement Haynesworth to the Supreme Court. The Senate refused
to confirm the appointment, in part because of Judge Haynes-
worth's participation in several cases involving companies in which
he had financial interests.226
B. Deficiencies of the Present Approach and Suggested Reforms
The rigid per se disqualification rule has been criticized for its
inflexibility, which may cause illogical and unjust results in particu-
227lar cases.  For example, under the current rule, a judge with a
tiny ownership interest in a party to a case over which he is presid-
ing is disqualified, regardless of whether the interest actually would
affect impartiality or even the appearance of impartiality. 228 The
rule is not only inflexible, but ignores the important concerns of
avoiding waste of judicial resources and preventing unnecessary de-
lays in litigation. This is particularly true because disqualification
motions often are made after the litigation is well under way.229
The rule also hampers administration of the federal judicial system
by hindering the ability of the courts of appeals to conduct en bane
reviews of panel decisions. En bane reviews are difficult in many
circuits because the per se rule frequently disqualifies so many cir-
cuit judges that not enough remain to grant a rehearing. As a re-
cent article reported:
In most circuits judges who recuse themselves are in effect
counted as voting "no" on the rehearing request.
As a result, the self-correcting mechanism of the federal ap-
peals courts is defeated. Because the U.S. Supreme Court re-
views only a tiny fraction of the cases brought before it, an
erroneous ruling by a three-judge panel can remain in force, with
226. One commentator, referring to the automatic disqualification for financial interest
rules, stated that "their rigidity may be simply an overreaction to the Haynesworth contro-
versy." Note, supra note 152, at 1545 n.50. See supra note 53 for a description of the contro-
versy. See also Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1984, at 56.
227. Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges-The Need for Better Guidelines, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 363 (1977).
228. See Note, supra note 151, at 1545 n.50. The per se rule "has the definite advantage
of clarity, but it is difficult to see why a judge who owns ten or twenty shares of AT&T should
automatically be branded as partial to AT&T as a party." Id.
229. For a discussion of why disqualification motions often are made late, see supra note
9 and accompanying text.
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no possibility of prompt correction.2 30
Another deficiency in the financial interest disqualification rule,
section 455(b)(4), is that it does not allow the parties to waive dis-
qualification.231  This is contrary to the rule under the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct and the pre-1974 section 455. Even if the parties are
convinced that the judge's small financial interest will not render
him biased and agree that he should be allowed to hear the case, the
judge still must disqualify himself. The refusal to permit waiver in
the amended statute was opposed by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. 232 The Office preferred a waiver option,
pointing out that in specific cases waiver may "be advantageous to
the litigants and in the best interests of the administration of jus-
tice." '233 Several members of Congress also objected to the inflexi-
bility of a per se rule that did not permit waiver. They complained
that this provision was "unreasonable and unrealistic.
234
230. Harper, supra note 226, at 56. See also Hall v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
700 F.2d 218, 218 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (dissent from denial of panel re-
hearing since required disqualifications prevent rehearings and give improper implication of
agreement).
Harper also indicated that not only commentators, but many federal judges are dissatis-
fied with the strict financial interest disqualification rule.
Many judges privately complain that these rules are "too Draconian." They de-
scribe them as overreactions to the Watergate scandal and to the U.S. Senate's re-
jection of Clement Haynesworth as a nominee to the Supreme Court in 1969 after
criticism of him for sitting in cases in which he had a financial interest. . . . In-
deed, it is a standing joke among judges in some circuits that the way to stay off a
particularly tough case or class of cases is to buy some stock in a company involved.
Harper, supra note 226, at 57.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1982).
232. Canon 3D of the Judicial Code, which the Administrative Office preferred, allows
waiver of disqualification when the judge has a financial interest if he discloses
on the record the basis of his disqualification. If based on such disclosure, the par-
ties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that
the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial,
the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of
the proceeding.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D (1980).
233. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6361.
234. Id. at 6362 (individual views of Representative Dennis of Indiana on S. 1064, con-
curred in by Representative Butler of Virginia).
The necessary effect of this inflexible provision is that, by legislative enactment, we
could have a true Daniel come to judgment-or a Learned Hand upon the bench-
and if the case involved, let us say, the Exxon Corporation, and the judge owned 20
shares of common stock, which he had inherited from his parents many years before
and had never particularly thought of since, he absolutely could not sit, even though
both parties to the cause preferred him-because of his expertise, learning, and in-
tegrity-to any and all available members of the judiciary.
To me, an inflexible provision of this kind does not make good sense, does not
make for the highest quality ofjustice, and represents an over-reaction to a problem
which. . . is largely nonexistent.
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Clearly the potential loss of capable, experienced judges, the dis-
ruption of litigation, and the resulting waste of judicial resources
are serious problems inherent in the per se rule. The combination
of disqualification for a tiny financial interest and the no-waiver rule
may damage public confidence in the federal judicial system by un-
necessarily requiring a judge to recuse himself even when the parties
have "unshaken confidence in a judge's neutrality." '235 In sum, the
per se financial interest disqualification rule has the opposite prob-
lem from the judicial bias disqualification rule-it is unresponsive to
the need for efficient administration of justice.
A case that illustrates the problems of the strict rule is In re
Cement Antitrust Litigation.236 A class action was filed alleging a
conspiracy among various cement and concrete producers to fix
prices in violation of antitrust laws. The plaintiff class had 210,235
members. The trial judge's wife held stock in seven of the plaintiff
class members with a total value of $29.70. Because of his wife's
small ownership interest, the trial judge ruled that he was required
to recuse himself.
On interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the court unanimously held that class members should be viewed as
parties for the purpose of section 455(b)(4) and thus the judge cor-
rectly recused himself for having financial interests in a party to the
proceeding.2 37 In lengthy dicta, the court made clear its unhappi-
ness with the result, but said the decision was mandated by the stat-
ute.2 38 "Thus after five years of litigation, a multi-million dollar
lawsuit of major national importance, with over 200,000 class plain-
Id. at 6363. See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,269 (1974).
The House Judiciary Committee defended the provision by arguing "[w]hile the ABA
Canon on disqualification would permit waiver in these ... instances, the committee believes
that confidence in the impartiality of federal judges is enhanced by a more strict treatment of
waiver." H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6357.
235. Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintaining An Appearance of
Justice Under 28 U.S.C § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 863, 880-81.
The parties may not waive disqualification in such a situation [when the judge has a
small financial interest] despite an unshaken confidence in a judge's neutrality.
Under such circumstances, the parties and the public may find this requirement
both inconvenient and unnecessary. Confidence in the operation of the federal judi-
cial system may thus be damaged and not enhanced . . . . The combination of
section 455(b) requirements with the strict waiver prohibition of section 455(b)...
may go beyond the Congressional goal of the appearance of justice to hamper the
operation of the federal judicial system.
Id.
236. 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.), affd mem. sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court,
459 U.S. 1191 (1982).
237. Id. at 1307-13.
238. Id. at 1313.
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tiffs, grinds to a halt over Mrs. Muecke's $29.70. "239
In general, the court noted, the per se financial interest disquali-
fication rule could "lead to major disruption of litigation and to the
loss of the judge with the most experience in the given matter, even
where the judge's financial interest in the party was insubstan-
tial. ' '24° These problems are especially likely in class actions be-
cause of the large number of parties. The court also pointed out the
difficulties resulting from mandatory recusal based on the financial
interests of the judge's spouse. First, with respect to male judges,
wives today are more likely to be independent in financial matters
than in the past. As a result, male judges are less able to avoid
being disqualified because they cannot control the finances or in-
vestments of their spouses.a41 Second, the court noted that as in-
creasing numbers of women become federal judges, there will be
more "judicial husbands" with similarly independent careers, plans,
and control of investments. "[F]rom a practical standpoint, federal
judges lack control over a significant area of potential conflict under
section 455."242
The Cement court concluded that applying the per se rule in
class action cases might seriously disrupt the efficient administra-
tion of justice.2 43 The court implied that a substantial interest test
may be more satisfactory in class action cases. It also proposed that
another tribunal, not the judge being challenged, should determine
whether recusal is warranted under a substantial interest test.
"Such a procedure would satisfy the concern that a judge not be the
arbiter of questions involving his own self-interest, yet would pre-
vent disruption of major litigation where the public interest so
dictates."2'
239. Id.
240. Id.
241.
Mhe judge may be unable to control the financial holdings or investment activities
of a spouse. The day has passed when a husband can order his wife to arrange her
financial affairs to suit his convenience. As increasing numbers of women establish
careers, the likelihood that judges' wives will insist on asserting the right to main-
tain independent judgment and control over their investments also increases.
Id. at 1314.
242. Id.
243.
[I]t now appears that theperse rule may give rise to a greater number of conflicts-
and a different kind-than initially anticipated by Congress. ... [We] question
whether the actual benefits of applying the per se rule in class action cases outweigh
the resultant disruption to the orderly and efficient administration of the judicial
system.
Id. at 1314-15.
244. Id. at 1315 n.19.
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The history of this case on appeal to the Supreme Court con-
firms the fears of the rule's critics. On petition for writ of certiorari,
four members of the Supreme Court disqualified themselves and
thus a quorum 245 of six Justices was not present. Therefore, with-
out considering the merits of the case, the Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Ninth Circuit.24 6 While no reasons for recusal were
stated, it is a reasonable inference that the four Justices, or their
spouses, also had ownership interests in some of the plaintiff class
members. This case thus demonstrates that the rigid per se rule of
disqualification for financial interest may force the Supreme Court
to fail to decide important legal questions for lack of a quorum.
The Cement case illustrates the range of problems inherent in
the per se rule of section 455(b)(4): disqualification of capable
judges due to insignificant financial interests, lack of control over
spousal assets, waste of judicial resources, delay in already lengthy
and complex litigation, and failure to address substantive issues be-
cause of lack of a Supreme Court quorum. Another important
problem is that the financial interest disqualification standard dis-
courages well-qualified persons from entering the judiciary. Given
relatively modest judicial salaries, many potential judicial nominees
do not want to rid themselves of investments intended to provide
security for their family's future. The rule, therefore, may have the
unintended effect of jeopardizing the long-term caliber of the federal
judiciary.
In response to these problems, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has proposed that the current section 455 be
amended.247 The proposed amendment would allow the parties to
waive a judge's disqualification if the reason for disqualification did
not arise until after "substantial judicial time had been devoted to
the matter" and the judge's interest would not be substantially af-
fected by the outcome of the case.248 The proposal provides that
even "in the absence of waiver, disqualification is not required if the
judge determines that the public interest in avoiding the cost of de-
lay of reassignment outweighs any appearance of impropriety aris-
ing from his continuing with the matter to completion."2 49 These
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (quorum requires six Justices).
246. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1982) (mem.). 28 U.S.C.
§ 2109 (1982) provides that when there is no quorum, the court must affirm the judgment
below "with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court."
247. 1980 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 81.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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proposed amendments show the Judicial Conference's concern
about the potential for harm to judicial efficiency in the current law.
Several other reforms would lessen these problems. At a mini-
mum, the parties should be allowed, on their own initiative, to
waive disqualification for financial interest as the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides."' 0 If the parties voluntarily agree that the judge
should participate, no harm can be done to their confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system by permitting them to waive disqual-
ification."5 ' Another desirable reform would be to set a minimum
value of financial interest, for example $1,000, below which disqual-
ification would not be required. This would prevent trivial interests
from disqualifying a judge, but still avoid the uncertainty of the sub-
stantial interest standard. Given the judicial oath of impartiality,252
such a rule should not present serious dangers of biased adjudica-
tion and would permit efficient administration of justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current federal judicial disqualification law continues to reflect
tensions between seemingly incompatible goals. The Constitution
requires that "neutral and detached judge[s]" preside over cases.25 3
In a democracy, the judiciary's authority ultimately depends on
public confidence in the integrity of the system and the impartiality
of its judges. However, these concerns must be balanced against
considerations of judicial efficiency and discouraging judge-shop-
ping by litigants. Judicial resolution of this tension has been diffi-
cult; the disqualification statutes often have been construed in
accord with the principle that disqualification should not be too
250. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
251. Waiver of disqualification was not permitted in the 1974 amendments, in part be-
cause of the litigants' understandable reluctance to insist that a judge recuse himself for fear
of alienating him by impliedly questioning his integrity. This problem arose because, under
the previous statute, a judge who knew about a potential disqualification situation often
would ask the parties if they wished that he recuse himself.
This concern cannot be used to defend the absence of waiver in a Code of Judicial Con-
duct-type system. Under the ABA Code and the reform suggested here the parties must
independently, on their own initiative, agree to waive disqualification in writing. Otherwise,
the judge is required to disqualify himself. See Note, supra note 20, at 1205 n.26 (1972).
252. The judicial oath states:
I, _ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without re-
spect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me
as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 453 (1982).
253. See supra note 6.
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readily achieved. Thus, despite the broader grounds for disqualifi-
cation resulting from the 1974 amendments, disqualification for ju-
dicial bias is extremely rare. Cases involving financial interest have
been treated differently. The 1974 statutory changes have made it
very easy to disqualify on this basis.
Both situations demonstrate the deficiencies of an absolutist ap-
proach to judicial disqualification. In cases of judicial bias, the goal
of avoiding the appearance of bias has been ignored. This is espe-
cially true when a judge holds publicly known, prior out-of-court
opinions on issues to be decided in the litigation pending before
him. On the other hand, the per se rule requiring disqualification
for a judge's financial interest in a case ignores the damage done to
the administration of justice through waste of judicial resources, de-
lay and expense in deferred litigation, and loss of well-qualified
judges.
The 1974 amendments attempted to provide more certain stan-
dards for disqualification in instances of both judicial bias and finan-
cial interest. Better solutions to the inherent problems in
disqualification law are available, however. More flexible ap-
proaches should be taken in both judicial bias and financial interest
cases. When there is a reasonable question of a judge's impartiality
because of his prior views on disputed legal issues or the subject
matter of the case, disqualification should be seriously considered.
This case-by-case approach is far better than the current, automatic
rejection of recusal because the claim falls under the rubric of "judi-
cial bias." In addition, it is consistent with the spirit and language
of section 455(a) and protects public confidence in the judiciary.
Referral of claims of judicial bias to another judge also would en-
hance public confidence. Reform in the financial interest disqualifi-
cation rule should include authorizing the parties to waive
disqualification and establishing a minimum financial interest for
which disqualification is required. These more flexible approaches
will allow disqualification law to be more responsive to the two fun-
damental interests of an impartial judiciary and judicial efficiency.
[VCol. 35:662
